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PUBLIC OFrIcE: VACANCY VEL NoN-EFFECT OF INDUCTION OF INCUmBENT.
-[Missouri].-A clerk of circuit court, elected at a general election, was
inducted under the Selective Service Act into the Army of the United States
(ten months and twelve days) before his office expired. Respondent was,
thereafter, appointed and commissioned by the Governor of the state to fill
the vacancy in the office apparently pursuant to a statute., The attorney
general, as relator, brought a proceeding in quo warranto to challenge the
respondent's right to hold the office of clerk of circuit court. HELD: Re-
spondent was not entitled to the office since an induction of a clerk into the
Army, resulting in his inability to perform the duties of the office did not
work a forfeiture to create a "vacancy" under the statute empowering the
Governor to fill the vacancy. State v. Wilson.
Whether a "vacancy" actually exists in a given situation is a difficult
question since there is no technical meaning of that word as applied to an
office.3 The court in State ex rel. Carson v. Harriso 4 defined "vacancy"
as follows:
"An office is not vacant so long as it is supplied in manner provided
by the constitution or law, with an incumbent who is legally qualified
to exercise the powers and perform the duties which pertain to it;
and conversely, it is vacant, in eye of law, wherever it is unoccupied
by a legally qualified incumbent who has a lawful right to continue
therein until happening of some future event."
The court therein decided that although the incumbent's term of office
expired, and the general assembly failed to elect a successor, there was
no vacancy so as to authorize the governor to appoint the president of a
benevolent institution. The decision reflects the general attitude of an-
tipathy to declare vacancies in office except those caused by death, resigna-
tion, or removal. The court declared that a wiser and more prudent course,
in case the electoral body failed to discharge its functions, was to allow
the incumbent to hold over rather than to say that a vacancy had occurred
and a successor should be appointed. It is submitted that the principal
case is influenced greatly by the above mentioned attitude.
Our supreme court recently held in the so-called Grayston case that a
judge of a circuit court who was called into the military service of the
United States did not vacate his judicial position.6 The constitutional limi-
tationT of "no person holding an office of profit under the United States
shall, during his continuance in such office hold any office of profit under
1. R. S. Mo. 1939 §13284.
2. State v. Wilson (Mo. 1942) 166 S. W. (2d) 499.
3. People v. Brundage (1920) 296 Ill. 197, 129 N. E. 500; State v.
Harrison (1888) 113 Ind. 434, 16 N. E. 384, 3 Am. St. Rep. 663; State v.
Young (1915) 137 La. 102, 68 So. 241; Frantz v. Davis (1926) 144 Va.
320, 131 S. E. 784; People v. Edwards (1892) 93 Cal. 153, 28 Pac. 831;
State ex rel. Wayland v. Herring (1907) 208 Mo. 708, 106 S. W. 984.
4. 113 Ind. 434, 16 N. E. 384, 3 Am. St. Rep. 663.
5. Hutcheson v. Pitts (1926) 170 Ark. 248, 278 S. W. 639; State v.
Boucher (1893) 3 N. D. 389, 56 N. W. 142, 21 L. R. A. 539; State v. John-
son (1925) 135 Wash. 109, 237 Pac. 12.
6. State v. Grayston (1942) 349 Mo. 700, 163 S. W. (2d) 335.
7. Article XIV, Sec. 4.
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this state" did not apply in cases where a person entered into military
service during times of emergency. The judge was called into the ser-
vice of the National Guard; and the court made a distinction between
those situations in which a person is drafted into the army during an
emergency and those in which a person voluntarily enters the Army for
the purpose of making it his profession. Another argument for sustaining
the decision is found in the fact that the militia, even when called out for
national emergency, basically retained its identity as a state organization.
There is conflict of authority on the question of whether induction of
an incumbent into the services of United States creates a vacancy of office. 8
Our court has recognized the existence of this conflict.9 Jurisdictions hold-
ing that a vacancy is created by an officer becoming a member of the armed
forces, do so upon the ground that a public officer is prohibited from holding
two incompatible offices.10 The rule is one of public policy. The court in
the Grayston case stated that because of our constitutional provisions1"
the office of judgeship and colonel was not incompatible.
The question arises whether a person may under our state laws hold a
state office and at the same time be in the Army of the United States in
active duty so as not to personally discharge the duties of his office. The
court has held that the constitutional requirement for personally discharg-
ing the duties of the office was designed to prevent "farming out" the per-
formance for the sake of convenience or profit,' 2 and hence was not appli-
cable to the situation herein presented.'3
In connection with the principal case it is interesting to note that in
our state the duties of a deputy are commensurate with that of the clerk
14
and the office of clerk of circuit court is a ministerial office.' 5 The result
8. State v. Allen (1863) 21 Ind. 516, 83 Am. Dec. 367; Fekete v. City
of East St. Louis (1924) 315 Ill. 58, 145 N. E. 692, 40 A. L. R. 650;
Commonwealth v. Smith (1942) 343 Pa. 446, 23 A (2d) 440.
9. State v. Grayston (1942) 349 Mo. 700, 163 S. W. (2d) 335.
10. Kennedy v. Cook (1940) 285 Ky. 9, 146 S. W. (2d) 56; Ex Parte
Archie Dailey (1922) 246 S. W. 91.
11. Article IV, Sec. 12. "No Senator or Representative shall, during the
term for which he shall have been elected, be appointed to any office under
this State, or any municipality thereof; and no member of Congress or
person holding any lucrative office under the United States, or this State,
or any municipality thereof (militia officers, justices of the peace and
notaries public excepted), shall be eligible to either house of the General
Assembly, or remain a member thereof, after having accepted any such
office or seat in either house of Congress."
12. Article II, Sec. 18. "That no person elected or appointed to any office
or employment of trust or profit under the laws of this State, or any
ordinance of any municipality in this State, shall hold such office without
personally devoting his time to the performance of the duties to the same
belonging."
13. State v. Grayston (1942) 349 Mo. 700, 163 S. W. (2d) 335; State v.
Slover (1892) 113 Mo. 202, 20 S. W. 788.
14. Springer v. McSpadden (1872) 49 Mo. 299, 300---"Although the
statute, when speaking of duties and powers of the clerk in respect to
taking acknowledgements, refers to him alone, yet it by no means follows
that he cannot act by deputy. The law, in prescribing the duties of clerks,
invariably designates the clerk alone, yet the functions of his office may
always be performed by deputy duly appointed."
15. State v. Hostetter (1897) 137 Mo. 636, 649, 39 S. W. 270.
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of the case might be put in issue when Missouri records and judicial pro-
ceedings are taken over by a party to a sister state for recognition. A
federal statute'6 provides for the attestation by the clerk of the court and
the judge of these records and judicial proceedings. Many state courts,
seemingly, have interpreted the statute to mean that the attestation must
be done personally by the clerk.17 In the early case of Williams 'V. Wil-
hams18 our court has reiterated the general rule. It there stated that the
transcript of judgment from a sister state, in order to satisfy the federal
statute, must be attested by the clerk of the court in which the judgment
was rendered and an attestation by a deputy in the name of the clerk is
insufficient. There the transcript was signed as follows: "W. H. Moyston,
Circuit Clerk, by James M. Anderson." The court, however, held that the
admission of the transcript in evidence was not prejudicial error warrant-
ing a reversal of judgment since the judge certified the signature, signed
by the deputy, to be that of the clerk. The court further held that such
formal defect in the certificate would contravene the mandate of the statute
which prohibits the courts from reversing judgment for error not materially
affecting the merits of the action.
The court in the principal case did not mention the above cited federal
statute in reaching its decision. In a criminal case the Kansas City Court
of Appeals held that it was error to receive in evidence a record from the
district court of Iowa showing that a witness of the defense had been con-
victed of a crime where the authenticating certificate was made by the
deputy clerk in the name of the clerk. 9 The court therein stated the
general rule and said:
"It is true that our statute, and if it be assumed that the statute
of Iowa also, makes the acts of the deputy in the name of his principal
the acts of his principal. Yet the validity of the certificate of a foreign
record does not depend upon the state laws. The state does not give
authority to the clerk. The clerk derives his authority from the law
of Congress, and not the law of the state." 20
Thus a person taking a judgment or proceeding signed by the deputy for
the clerk to another state having the same rule as that stated above may
encounter difficulty getting full faith and credit to the same. Since the
duties of the clerk may be performed by the deputies in Missouri, all acts
being valid and effective within Missouri, a deputy performing the duties of
an incumbent in military service may be unable to give the required authen-
tication in jurisdictions following this general rule.21 In sister states fol-
16. 28 U. S. C. A. Sec. 687.
17. See Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Cutter (1877) 19 Kan. 83; Willock v.
Wilson (1901) 178 Mass. 68, 59 N. E. 757; Morris v. Patchin (1862) 24
N. Y. 394, 82 Am. Dec. 311; Lothrop v. Blake (1846) 3 Pa. (3 Barr) 483;
Ensign v. Kindred (1894) 163 Pa. 638, 30 Atl. 274, 35 Wkly. Notes Cas.
225; Edwards v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) 137 S. W. 1161.
18. (1893) 53 Mo. App. 617.
19. State v. Foreman (1906) 97 S. W. 269.
20. Also. In accord: Priest v. Capitain (1911) 236 Mo. 446, 465, 139
S. W. 204, 210.
21. The clerk of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, aware of the
holding in the principal case, acting cautiously, will continue to sign per-
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lowing the rule that a certificate of judgment by a deputy is sufficient if
the presiding judge certifies that it is in due form of law, there is no need
for a clerk of court to personally sign the certificates.22
It is submitted that the principal case may be justified upon the desire
of our court to follow the national policy of re-employing all persons enter-
ing military service and all due consideration should be given to our fight-
ing forces. 2  M. E.
SALPs-IMPLIE WARRANTY Op WHoLEsoMENEsS--[Texas].-Plaintiff's
husband bought from a retail merchant some sausage commercially known
as "Cervelot." The manufacturer had advertised the sausage as being suit-
able for human consumption in the summer time. It was consumed soon
after the purchase by members of plaintiff's family; and as a result of
having eaten the sausage one child died and other members of the family
became seriously ill. Plaintiff, whose husband had died from other causes,
brought suit against the manufacturer for herself and as next friend for
those members of her family who became ill. The jury found that the
sausage, at the time of processing and manufacturing, was so contaminated
and poisonous as to be unfit for human consumption. The jury also found
that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was negligent. The Texas Dis-
trict Court and Court of Appeals gave judgment for the plaintiff. Held,
Affirmed. The manufacturer and vendor of sausage is liable to consumers
for injuries caused them by poisonous and contaminated substances in the
sausage at the time the manufacturer processed and sold the same, even
though the manufacturer was not negligent in the processing thereof. The
retailer of foods has an absolute duty to sell only wholesome food, and is
liable to the consumer for a breach of such duty when the latter relies
on the former in the selection of the food and has no opportunity to ex-
amine it. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps.,
In addition to possible remedies against the retailer, there being no
express warranty that the food is wholesome, there are two alternative
remedies against the manufacturer open to the injured consumer of food
sold for immediate human consumption. One is an action in tort for the
negligence of the manufacturer and the other is an action for breach of
sonally all judgments when he knows these are to be sued upon in other
states.
22. Stedman v. Patchin (1861) 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 218.
23. Selective Service Act (1940) 50 U. S. C. A. (Sec.) 308.
"(b) In the case of any such person who, in order to perform such
training and service, has left or leaves a position, other than a tem-
porary position, in the employ of any employer and who (1) receives
such certificate, (2) is still qualified to perform the duties of such posi-
tion, and (3) makes application for reemployment within 40 days after
he is relieved from such training and service-
(C) if such position was in the employ of any State or political sub-
division thereof, it is hereby declared to be the sense of the Congress
that such person should be restored to such position or to a position of
like seniority, status, and pay."
1. (Texas 1942) 164 S. W. (2d) 828.
1948]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol28/iss4/10
